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THE EVER WIDENING SCOPE OF FACT




THE HONORABLE JOHN F. NANGLE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1957 Professor Charles Alan Wright expressed alarm that the ap-
pellate courts were, by various methods, drawing unto themselves al-
most complete power over our judicial system.I One of the methods
being utilized in this process,' argued Professor Wright, was the misin-
terpretation by the appellate courts of the "Clearly Erroneous Rule."'3
In 1981, twenty-four years after Professor Wright's warning, the
scope of appellate fact review continues to widen. The expansion that
has occurred in the federal courts is of principal concern to this writer.
An important factor underlying the expansion of appellate court power
is the avoidance of Rule 52(a) or the circumvention of it by ever-
changing interpretations. Appellate judges have "become bolder [and
bolder]. ' '4 Not only have they refused to be bound by trial court find-
ings based on documentary evidence, as mentioned by Professor
Wright,5 but also such courts have made exceptions to the Clearly Er-
roneous Rule in findings based on deposition evidence and on disputed
underlying facts. Appellate courts have increasingly moved toward the
* United States District Judge, Eastern District of Missouri. B.A., 1943, University of Mis-
souri, J.D., 1948, Washington University. This Article was initially presented as the subject of a
panel discussion at the Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference in Rapid City, South Dakota on Au-
gust 23, 1979.
1. Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience f Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Doubtful Omniscience]. This article was, to some extent, an update on prior
arguments by Professor Leon Green. L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 380 (1930).
2. Doubt6fl Omniscience, supra note 1, at 764-71.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a):
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge.., the credibility of the witnesses.
Id
4. Doubtful Omniscience, supra note I, at 751.
5. Id at 764-71.
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position that the second clause of the Clearly Erroneous Rule-"and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge
...the credibility of the witnesses"-limits the application of the Rule
rather than merely adding a specific additional restriction to their au-
thority.6
The appellate courts have failed increasingly to accord to the trial
court's findings of fact the respect and deference envisioned by the
Clearly Erroneous Rule. Although purporting to pay homage to the
Clearly Erroneous Rule, appellate courts have become less reticent to
substitute their view of the evidence for that of the trial court to "do
justice."7
The writer is not alone in this viewpoint. During the last few years
the trial bench and bar have expressed a growing concern on this point.
Trial judge Andrew Bogue, in a letter to this writer,' expressed the con-
cern as follows:
[I] feel that there is more criticism directed to the appellate courts than
ever before, particularly on this clearly erroneous rule and also upon the
trial de novo issue, which can in some instances be the same things. The
credibility of the trial judges is being challenged and the attorneys have
consistently told me in recent years that they automatically appeal be-
cause they "get two bites out of the apple". They not only get a ruling by
the trial court but they get a good chance of getting a trial de novo in the
appellate court as well because of the appellate court's failure to recognize
the clearly erroneous rule and apply it.9
The current mood of the trial bar fully comports with Judge Bogue's
view.
Hopefully, this Article will be considered as it is intended-a genu-
ine expression of alarm over the great imbalance that has developed
6. Id at 769-70.
7. Id at 779.
8. Letter from the Honorable Andrew W. Bogue, United States District Judge for the Dis-
trict of South Dakota, to the Honorable John F. Nangle (April 19, 1979).
Of the seven lawyers gathered here, excepting me, six of them had very, very strong
ideas that the appellate courts were searching for error rather than the truth in most of
their cases and that they simply did not give credit to the trial judges which is required
under the clearly erroneous rule. This was not limited to any particular court, but was
their feeling as to both state and federal courts. The seventh attorney said that he rather
suspected it depended upon the success of each individual as to whether he believed the
rule was being eroded. In other words, when an attorney loses he feels they ignored the





between trial courts and appellate courts. The purpose of this Article is
not to rehash any individual case. The writer's aim is to call attention
to this issue and, hopefully, to secure a rethinking of the Clearly Erro-
neous Rule by both bench and bar.
In this Article, a brief historical background to the Clearly Erroneous
Rule is presented because many of the current problems are best under-
stood against this background. The language of the Rule and its
Supreme Court interpretations are also examined. Then the current
application of the Rule by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is ex-
plored. In this connection, the application by the Eighth Circuit is con-
sidered because of this writer's familiarity with that circuit, not because
of any problems unique to it.' A recent student note" ably reviewed
the applications of the Rule in the various circuits, and there is no need
to do so again in this Article. Rather, the application of the Rule by the
Eighth Circuit is examined merely to illustrate what this writer feels is
the uncertainty and confusion surrounding the Rule's present applica-
tion in all of the Circuit Courts of Appeals. Thereafter the Article dis-
cusses the consequences of the treatment given Rule 52(a) and the
writer's general conclusions.
II. APPELLATE FACTUAL REVIEW PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: A BRIEF
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Cases tried to a jury before the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1937 presented, perhaps, the most easily understood
standard of appellate review. There were no categories or levels of re-
view depending on the type of fact that was found,' 2 and the all-en-
compassing standard was simply stated. Facts found by a jury were not
to be overturned by the appellate court unless there was no substantial
evidence to support the findings.' 3 The review of jury verdicts was by
writ of error, and the appellate court could reverse only if the jury was
10. Indeed, quite the contrary seems true-the problems are not limited by circuit bounda-
ries.
11. Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and the Scope of Appellate Fact Review: Has
Application of the Clearly Erroneous Rule Been Clearly Erroneous?, 52 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 68
(1977).
12. See notes 22-26 infra and accompanying text (regarding appellate review of the findings
of an equity court).
13. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891).
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improperly instructed on the law or obviously misapplied the law. 14
The jury could disregard all conflicting evidence and choose to believe
only one side.15 Even so, if there was any evidence presented that
would support the jury's findings, the appellate court was powerless to
overturn these findings.1 6
The narrow review was apparently dictated by the seventh amend-
ment.1 7 The amendment states, "no fact tried by a jury, shall be other-
wise reexamined by any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of common law."18 The adoption of the Federal Rules has
not altered this scope of review, 9 but, as noted by Professor Wright,2"
appellate courts have found the seventh amendment to be no impedi-
ment to review of the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial on
the ground that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence. 2
Review of findings by the court in equity cases was not as narrow.
No simply stated rule was applicable, as in the case of findings by a
jury. The proper scope of review was not entirely clear, which partly
explains the present uncertainty surrounding the application of the
Clearly Erroneous Rule.22
The trial court's findings were generally considered presumptively
correct and would be upheld on appeal unless clearly against the
weight of the evidence or induced by an erroneous view of the law.23
"Presumptively correct," however, apparently took on different mean-
ings depending on the type of evidence to be reviewed. Findings based
on oral evidence were not reversed unless clearly erroneous because of
the trial court's superior position to judge the demeanor and credibility
of the witnesses.24 Findings based on documentary or undisputed evi-
dence were subject to more extensive review because the appellate
court was apparently in a position as good as the trial court to weigh
14. Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 113 (9th Cir. 1962).
15. Willoughby v. City of Chicago, 235 U.S. 45 (1914).
16. 13 WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3502 (1973).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
18. Id
19. Basham v. Pennsylvania R.R., 372 U.S. 699, 700-01 (1963).
20. Doubtful Omniscience, supra note 1, at 758-63.
21. Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 239 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
22. See Note, supra note 11, at 69-72. But see Comment, Scope of Appellate Fact Review
Widened, 2 STAN. L. REv. 784, 785-86 (1950).
23. Comment, supra note 22, at 786.




the evidence and make findings from the record .2  Findings based on
disputed documentary evidence were presumed correct, although the
review was more extensive than when oral findings were concerned.26
This tri-level standard of review was not simply applied or easily
followed. The confusion surrounding its application loomed large in
the later confusion surrounding the application of the Clearly Errone-
ous Rule.
The Act of March 3, 186527 allowed waiver of a jury trial in all legal
actions. Thus the hybrid situation of a legal action tried to the court
was born. The issue arose: Were the findings of the court in such ac-
tions entitled to the same finality of those of a jury in other legal ac-
tions, or were they subject to the more extensive review of the findings
of a court in equity actions? The general consensus was that such find-
ings were to be given the same weight as those of a jury.2" "Where a
jury is waived, a trial judge functions as both judge and jury, and his
findings of fact are in all respects as final and conclusive as a verdict of
a jury would have been had the issues of fact been determined by a
verdict."29
III. THE ADOPTION OF THE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS RULE AND
SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION
It is against this background of appellate factual review that Rule
52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was adopted. The Fed-
eral Rules abandoned the procedural distinctions between law and eq-
uity.3" Therefore, it was no longer deemed advisable to differentiate
the finality accorded the trial court's findings based on characterization
of the case as legal or equitable. The issue, however, was whether to
unite under the banner of the legal standard or the equitable standard.
Resolution of the issue was not without serious debate.
Judge Charles E. Clark, the Reporter of the Advisory Committee on
the Rules and one of the most respected authorities in the field at the
time, advocated the adoption of the standard of review previously ap-
25. Id
26. Id
27. Ch. 86, § 4, 13 Stat. 501 (1865).
28. United States v. Washington Dehydrated Food Co., 89 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1937).
29. Id
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 1, 2.
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plied in jury-waived legal cases in all cases tried without a jury.3
Judge W.C. Chesnut concurred with Clark.3" Judge Chesnut feared
that adoption of the equitable standard would derogate from the im-
portance of the trial judge's judicial function.33
Professor W.W. Blume, on the other hand, feared that granting final-
ity to the trial court's findings would arouse distrust and suspicion in
the public mind. Blume therefore favored adoption of the equitable
standard in all cases.3 4 Professor Blume felt that appellate courts
should be able to review facts as well as law to insure the administra-
tion of justice.
Adoption of the equitable standard in all cases prevailed. In the pre-
liminary draft of the rules the standard of review was stated as follows:
"The findings of the court in such cases [actions tried upon the facts
without a jury] shall have the same effect as that heretofore given to
findings in suits in equity."3 6 It was feared, however, that the proposed
rule would incorporate the uncertainty associated with the prevailing
equity practice.37 The Rule as finally adopted did not refer specifically
to the prior practice in reviewing findings of equity courts but, rather,
formulated a standard to be applied in all cases.
The standard, commonly referred to as the Clearly Erroneous Rule,
reads as follows: "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge ...the credibility of the witnesses."38 The language
employed is not complex; the sentence is not overly complicated, and
the words are not multisyllabic. Yet the misunderstanding and misap-
plication of this simple rule has given rise to unending debate.
The notes of the Advisory Committee on the Rules commented on
the Clearly Erroneous Rule as follows: "The rule. . . accords with the
decisions on the scope of the review in modem federal equity practice.
It is applicable in all classes of findings in cases tried without a jury
31. Clark, Review of Facts Under Proposed Federal Rules, 20 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 129 (1936).
32. Chesnut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A. J. 533
(1936).
33. Id
34. Blume, Review of Facts in Non-Jury Cases, 20 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 68 (1936).
35. Blume, Review of Facts in Jury Cases-The Seventh Amendment, 20 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y
130 (1936).
36. Note, supra note 11, at 72-73.
37. Note, supra note I I, at 73 n.24.




whether the finding is of a fact concerning which there was conflict of
testimony, or of a fact deduced or inferred from uncontradicted testi-
mony."'3 9 The ambiguity of this seemingly innocuous comment is read-
ily apparent. It was not at all clear that "scope of the review in modem
federal equity practice" was the same for "all classes of findings.
40
Nevertheless, the Comment sets forth the Committee's view that the
same standard is applicable regardless of the nature of the evidence on
which the finding was based. This view was meant to prevail.
Although one should not become bound, of course, by the strict
meaning of words, it is useful to inspect the definition of "clearly.
41
"Clearly" is defined, with respect to something asserted or observed, as
"without doubt or question." 42 Therefore, the Clearly Erroneous Rule
apparently would require that appellate courts refrain from reversing a
trial court's finding of fact unless the appellate court is convinced the
finding is erroneous "without doubt or question." Sadly, the law does
not generally evolve in a straight-forward manner. The nature of
courts is continually to redefine and reformulate the standards by
which the law is applied.
The initial Supreme Court exposition on the meaning of the Clearly
Erroneous Rule was in United States v. United States Gypsum Co. 4
3
The Court stated:
[Rule 52(a)] was intended, in all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury, to make applicable the then prevailing equity practice .... The
practice in equity prior to the present Rules of Civil Procedure was that
the findings of the trial court, when dependent upon oral testimony where
the candor and credibility of the witnesses would best be judged, had
great weight with the appellate court. The findings were never conclusive,
however. A finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
andflrm conviction that a mistake has been committed 44
The emphasized language, which restates the clearly erroneous stan-
dard, has been used continually by the Supreme Court.45
39. 5 MooRE's, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 52.01[4] (2d ed. 1951); Doubtful Omniscience, supra
note 1, at 765.
40. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
41. See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945).
42. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 420 (1971).
43. 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
44. Id at 394-95 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
45. The above formulation was cited approvingly as recently as 1978. Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 74 n.19 (1978).
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The value of this restatement, however, may be questioned. First,
there is doubt that any restatement was necessary; "a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed" does not appear to be
any more easily understandable or applicable than the original
phrase--"clearly erroneous." The new phraseology did no more than
further muddle an already elusive standard.
Furthermore, there is doubt that Gypsum truly captured the essence
of the Rule. Whenever there are two versions of the facts, or two inter-
pretations of undisputed facts, the trial court and then the appellate
court must choose which version or interpretation to believe. In mak-
ing the choice, a court is necessarily convinced of the correctness of the
chosen view and is necessarily, therefore, convinced that the opposing
view is erroneous. Being convinced that a view is erroneous, however,
is not the same as being convinced that a view is clearly erroneous. A
court may be convinced of the correctness of its view and at the same
time concede the merit of the opposing view. Whether the requirement
that the appellate court be "definitely and firmly" convinced of the cor-
rectness of its choice actually provides a solution for this problem is
questionable. A court may on making a choice simply say that it is
definitely and firmly convinced of the choice. Whether the require-
ment is actually one of substance is doubtful.
In any event, this is the phraseology initially adopted and consist-
ently applied by the Supreme Court. There is value in consistency,
even though the precise words used may be of questionable value.
The Supreme Court has commented several times on the value of
restricted appellate review of findings of fact. In Commissioner v. Du-
berstein4 the Court stated:
Decision of the issue presented in these cases must be based ultimately on
the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the main-
springs of human conduct to the totality of the facts of each case. The
nontechnical nature of the statutory standard, the close relationship of it
to the data of practical human experience, and the multiplicity of relevant
factual elements, with their various combinations, creating the necessity
of ascribing the proper force to each, confirm us in our conclusion that
primary weight in this area must be given to the conclusions of the trier of
fact.47
46. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).




Similarly, in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman48 the Court com-
mented that there was "great value" in appellate courts showing defer-
ence to the fact finding of the trial courts. 49
The Supreme Court has consistently followed the comments of the
Advisory Committee with respect to application of the Rule to all
classes of findings. The Rule applies to factual inferences derived from
undisputed basic facts.5 0 If the underlying facts are undisputed, argua-
bly the inferences to be drawn from them are as readily drawn by the
appellate court as by the trial court. The Supreme Court apparently
rejected the view that direct observation of witnesses is the controlling
criterion of the weight to be accorded the trial court's findings."
The Supreme Court has stressed, however, the particularly appropri-
ate nature of restricted review in cases in which the trial court is in a
unique position to weigh the evidence. The Court has found the
Clearly Erroneous Rule especially applicable in two instances: when
evidence is largely the testimony of experts as to which the trial court
may be enlightened by scientific demonstrations52 and when a vast rec-
ord of distant transactions, motives, and purposes is presented, the ef-
fect of which depends largely on the credibility of witnesses. 53
Finally, the Supreme Court has left no doubt that findings of fact
need not be sustained if they are based on an erroneous view of the
law. 4 This aspect of the prior practice has obviously survived.
The Supreme Court decisions that touch on the application of the
Clearly Erroneous Rule leave the impression that review of factual
48. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
49. Id at 534 n.8.
50. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 194 n.9 (1963); Commissioner v. Duber-
stein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394
(1948). Cf. United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127, 141-42 n.16 (1966) (where the Court
says in dicta that the rationale behind the Rule, the trial court's opportunity to observe the de-
meanor and credibility of the witnesses, is of less force in a "paper case"; the Court does not say,
however, that the Rule is inapplicable in such cases.).
51. This approach was carried to extreme in Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950). In this opinion, Judge Jerome N. Frank set out seven narrowly
defined categories, each determined by the type of case and the importance of oral testimony to
the result reached. He argued that the scope of appellate review was dependent upon the class in
which the case was placed. This opinion was severely criticized in Comment, supra note 22.
52. Graver Tank Mfg., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 274-75 (1949).
53. United States v. Oregon State Med. Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 332 (1952).
54. Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698,701 (1962); Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467,
475 (1943).
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findings by appellate courts is to be quite restricted." Although blind
adherence to such findings is not mandated, substantial deference is
required.56 Whether the appellate courts have followed this mandate is
the next topic of discussion.
IV. PRESENT APPLICATION OF THE RULE
As stated earlier, 7 the present application of the Rule in the Eighth
Circuit is stressed in this section. This selectivity should not be taken to
mean, however, that the problems are unique to this Circuit. Rather,
the application of the Rule in this Circuit clearly illustrates the
problems that exist in all federal appellate courts.
Two basic difficulties accompany the use of the Rule in the Eighth
Circuit. First, the Rule is constantly restated and reformulated. Al-
though mere rewording of the Rule would not be a cause for concern, it
is this writer's belief that the various formulations expressed also alter
the substance of the Rule's application. Furthermore, these casual re-
formulations reflect a basic disrespect for the essence of the Rule. It is
as if the appellate court feels that it is free to do whatever it wishes after
stating the proper talismanic words. The meaning of the words is over-
looked. Second, there is continuous disagreement in this Circuit as to
when the Rule is applicable and as to whether credibility determina-
tions are the touchstone of applicability.
The Eighth Circuit has never been satisfied with the phrase "clearly
erroneous." In a fashion similar to the Supreme Court in Gypsum,58
the Eighth Circuit has rephrased the Rule in more comfortable terms.
Unlike the Supreme Court, however, the Eighth Circuit has not consist-
ently applied the same formulation.
The late Judge Sanborn rendered one of the first interpretations of
the Clearly Erroneous Rule in the Eighth Circuit. He reformulated the
rule as follows: "The findings of fact of the court below to the extent
that they are unsupported by substantial evidence, or are clearly
against the weight of the evidence, or were induced by an erroneous
view of the law, are not binding upon this Court. 5 9 In stating that
55. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290 (1960) ("appellate review of findings in
this field must be quite restricted").
56. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969).
57. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
58. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).




findings which are unsupported by substantial evidence were not bind-
ing on the appellate court, Judge Sanborn was undoubtedly correct.
"[Uinsupported by substantial evidence" is the standard utilized to
overturn findings of a jury,60 and was the standard used before adop-
tion of the Federal Rules to overturn findings by the court in a jury-
waived law case.6' The standard is more restrictive than the clearly
erroneous standard was meant to be.62 To say, therefore, that a finding
is unsupported by substantial evidence is perforce to say it is clearly
erroneous.
This characterization of the Clearly Erroneous Rule is correct, how-
ever, only when read in conjunction with the next phrase--"or are
clearly against the weight of the evidence. ' 63 A finding may be sup-
ported by substantial evidence, yet still not be binding on the appellate
court if it is clearly against the weight of the evidence.' Conversely, a
finding that is clearly against the weight of the evidence always will be
unsupported by substantial evidence.
Therefore, the phrase "unsupported by substantial evidence!' is su-
perfluous to Judge Sanborn's formulation, although the inclusion of the
phrase does not distort the meaning of the Rule. It does not change the
meaning of the formulation, because any misconception caused by it is
corrected by addition of the second phrase.
Problems developed, however, when Judge Sanborn's reformulation
was itself reformulated, and when the converse of his formulation was
also stated as the Rule. Judge Sanborn himself was one of the first to
fall into the trap. Nine years after his opinion in Aetna Life Insurance
co. v. Kepler,6 he stated the rule as follows: "The findings of fact of a
trial court should be accepted by this Court as being correct unless it
can be clearly demonstrated that they are without adequate evidentiary
utilized in numerous subsequent cases. Richmond v. Caner, 616 F.2d 381, 383 (8th Cir. 1980);
Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282, 1291 (8th Cir. 1979); Stanley v. Henderson, 597 F.2d 651,
653 (8th Cir. 1979); Southern Ill. Stone Co. v. Universal Eng'r Corp., 592 F.2d 446, 451 (8th Cir.
1979).
60. See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
61. See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
62. See text accompanying notes 30-37 supra.
63. Aetna Life Ins. v. Kepler, 116 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1941).
64. 2B BARRON-HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE Rev. Rules § 1135 at 549
(1961). See also concurring opinion of Judge Lay in Jackson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
422 F.2d 1272, 1275 (8th Cir.) (Lay, J., concurring), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 855 (1970).
65. 116 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1941).
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support or were induced by an erroneous view of the law."66 This for-
mulation has been adopted subsequently in this Circuit.67
The exact meaning of this formulation is unclear. Does "without ad-
equate evidentiary support" mean "unsupported by substantial evi-
dence," "against the weight of the evidence," or something in between?
If the former, the Rule stated unnecessarily restricts review. Even
though it might not be "clearly demonstrated" that a finding is unsup-
ported by substantial evidence, the finding might still be clearly errone-
ous.68 When read in context, Judge Sanborn's formulation may have
indeed meant this former interpretation because, immediately before
the above-quoted statement, he stated that there is no logical reason to
place the findings of fact of a trial court on a substantially lower level
of conclusiveness than those of a jury or an administrative agency.69
Sanborn's apparent misstatement of the Rule became more obvious
in subsequent decisions. Sanborn's "adequate" later became "substan-
tial," and the Rule, as formulated in Cole v. Neaf, then read: "Findings
of fact can be set aside only upon clear demonstration that they are
without substantial evidentiary support or that they are induced by an
erroneous view of the law."' When viewed in light of the common
understanding of the phrase "substantial evidence,"'" the formulation
is too restrictive.
Other variations of the Cole formulation have appeared. The appel-
late courts "can upset fact findings only when they are not supported by
substantial evidence,"7 and "a finding is clearly erroneous only. . . if
66. Pendergrass v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1950). It is interesting
to note that Judge Sanborn also quotes his prior formulation in this opinion. Id at 137. This
shows the ease of confusion resulting from constant restating of the Rule, because there is no
indication in the opinion that Judge Sanborn thought he was changing the substance of the Rule
by restating it.
67. Republic Rice Mill, Inc. v. Empire Rice Mills, Inc., 313 F.2d 717, 721 (8th Cir. 1963);
Collins v. Owen, 310 F.2d 884, 884-85 (8th Cir. 1962); Nelson v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 269 F.2d 882,
886 (8th Cir. 1959).
68. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
69. Pendergrass v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1950).
70. Cole v. Neaf, 334 F.2d 326, 329 (8th Cir. 1964) (emphasis added). This formulation has
been utilized in subsequent cases. United Stores of Am., Inc., v. Insurance Consultants, Inc., 468
F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1972); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 370 F.2d 97, 100
(8th Cir. 1966); Lewis v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 364 F.2d 555, 556 (8th Cir. 1966).
71. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). See also notes 11-16 supra and
accompanying text.
72. Tyson v. Iowa, 283 F.2d 802, 809 (8th Cir. 1960). See also Cotton v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d
670, 671 (8th Cir. 1980).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss2/2
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS RULE
substantial evidentiary support is lacking."73
Several decisions have stated that if a finding is supported by sub-
stantial evidence, the reviewing court may nevertheless reverse the
finding if "satisfied" that a mistake has been made.74 Although these
decisions commendably recognize that support by substantial evidence
does not necessarily mean a finding is not clearly erroneous,7s the for-
mulation allows for review of trial court findings beyond that contem-
plated by the Rule. To be "satisfied" that a mistake has been made is
far from being "definitely and firmly convinced" 76 and is far from say-
ing a finding is "clearly erroneous." 77
Another standardless standard was expressed by the Eighth Circuit
in Gay Lib v. University of Missouri.78 In commenting on the scope of
review in court-tried cases, it was stated that "there is still the qualita-
tive factor of truth and right of the case-the impression that a funda-
mentally wrong result has been reached. ' 79 This statement comes as
close to Wright's concern that appellate courts seek to "do justice" in
each case80 as is reasonable to expect an appellate court to admit.
Finally, the phraseology initially adopted by the Supreme Court-
"definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed"-is
used by the Eighth Circuit in some opinions."'
This writer's belief is that the utilization of various formulations by
the Eighth Circuit reflects the growing tendency of appellate courts to
employ differing standards on a case-by-case basis to "do justice."
Some formulations reflect a more restrictive scope of review than con-
templated by the Rule; 2 some a more expansive scope.8 3 The inconsis-
73. Whitson v. Yaffe Iron & Metal Corp., 385 F.2d 168, 169 (8th Cir. 1967). See also Sher-
man v. Lawless, 298 F.2d 899, 902 (8th Cir. 1962).
74. Automated Controls, Inc. v. MIC Enterprises, Inc., 599 F.2d 288, 289 (8th Cir. 1979);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Goldman, 593 F.2d 129, 131 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 838 (1979).
75. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
76. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
78. 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977).
79. Id at 853 n.10 (citing Oil Screw Noah's Ark v. Bentley & Felton Corp., 322 F.2d 3, 5-6
(5th Cir. 1963)).
80. Doubtful Omniscience, supra note 1, at 779.
81. Arkansas Educ. Ass'n v. Portland, Ark. Bd. of Educ., 446 F.2d 763, 770 (8th Cir. 1971);
Barryhill v. United States, 300 F.2d 690, 694 (8th Cir. 1962).
82. See notes 66-73 supra and accompanying text.
83. See notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text.
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tency concerns this writer.84 It indicates a casual attitude toward the
Rule, which, in turn, reflects a casual attitude toward its application.
Were the appellate court to consciously and deliberately consider the
meaning of the formulation it adopts, it is likely that it would act with
greater reluctance before reversing a trial court's findings of fact.
The other problem in this Circuit is disagreement as to the applica-
tion of the Rule to various classes of findings. It is clear to this writer
that the Supreme Court and the drafters of the Rule view the Rule as
applicable to all classes of findings. The Eighth Circuit decisions reflect
disagreement on this issue. In Cole v. Nea 85 the court stated: "We
have repeatedly and consistently held, at least subsequent to the
Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Du-
berstein, [citation omitted], that the clearly erroneous standard applies
to reasonable inferences to be drawn from stipulated or undisputed
facts and that it is for the trial court rather than this court to draw
legitimate and permissible inferences."86 The Eighth Circuit rejected
any contention that credibility determinations are the touchstone of the
Rule's applicability. 7
Whatever was "repeatedly and consistently" held in 1964, however,
84. The present Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit, the Honorable Donald P. Lay, expressed a
similar concern more than ten years ago in his concurring opinion in Jackson v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 422 F.2d 1272, 1275 (8th Cir.) (Lay, J., concurring), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 855
(1970).
85. 334 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1964).
86. Id at 329.
87. The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly stated, however, that application of the rule is particu-
larly appropriate when resolution of conflicting evidence involves credibility determinations. Kel-
lin v. ACF Indus., 629 F.2d 532, 534 (8th Cir. 1980); Stanley v. Henderson, 597 F.2d 651, 653 (8th
Cir. 1979); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Goldman, 593 F.2d 129, 131 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 838 (1979); Lide v. Carothers, 570 F.2d 253, 256 (8th Cir. 1978). See also note 53
supra and accompanying text.
This rule is soundly based. It is impossible for any appellate judge or judges to read a bare
transcript and secure from it all of the nuances bearing on the question of credibility--the lifted
eyebrow; the "yes" which means "no" or "maybe," or vice versa; the delays or hesitations in
answering questions; the soft-spoken word; the loud voice; the nervous voice; the quizzical glance.
See Kellin v. ACF Indus., 629 F.2d at 534.
This, of course, does not mean that the appellate court is powerless to overturn a trial court's
credibility determination. In Wharton v. Knefel, 415 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Mo. 1976), the trial court
specifically found the testimony of Hedy Epstein to be "totally lacking in credibility, and not
worthy of any consideration." Id at 635. The appellate court, on an extensive review of the
factors which led to the trial court's conclusion, found that such a determination was unjustified,
although never specifically referring to the trial court's conclusion as "clearly erroneous." Whar-
ton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550, 554 (8th Cir. 1977). This writer has no quarrel with exercise of such
reviewing power in appropriate cases. It should be remembered, however, as appellate courts
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss2/2
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is no longer repeatedly and consistently held. Recent decisions are
anything but consistent. Perhaps the inconsistency is best illustrated by
Gay Lib v. University of Missouri.88 Resolution of Gay Lib turned on
whether defendants had met their burden of showing that recognition
by the state university of a homosexual rights group would be likely to
cause an increase in violations of state laws prohibiting homosexual
activities.89 Resolution of the issue was admittedly a close question.90
Conflicting views of experts were presented in the district court on the
issue.9' These views were presented to the district court in the adminis-
trative record developed before filing of the suit.92
The trial court found that recognition of the group would likely in-
crease violations of state laws.93 Defendants argued that the finding
was binding on the appellate court because it was not clearly errone-
ous.94 The appellate court, however, said that it was not bound by the
trial court's findings of fact. "IT]his court is not bound by the district
court's credibility evaluation of witnesses where the evidence is submit-
ted by deposition or in other documentary form."95
Judge Regan dissented.96 He believed that the Clearly Erroneous
Rule was fully applicable even though the trial court had no better op-
portunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 97 Judges Gibson and
Henley, in dissenting from the denial of a petition for rehearing en
bane, expressed a similar view.98 Judge Stephenson, however, although
agreeing with Judge Gibson and Henley that rehearing en bane should
have been granted, stated that the Clearly Erroneous Rule was inappli-
cable.99
The prior law in the Eighth Circuit was clearly supportive of the
view expressed by Judges Regan, Gibson, and Henley. Numerous
generally have, that a finding as to credibility made by the trial court after hearing oral testimony
is entitled to great weight and should be overturned only with the greatest reluctance.
88. 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977).
89. Id See also Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 416 F. Supp. 1350, 1369 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
90. Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 1977).
91. Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 416 F. Supp. 1350, 1368-70 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
92. Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1977).
93. Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 416 F. Supp. 1350, 1368-70 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
94. Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 853 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977).
95. Id
96. Id at 858-59 (Regan, J., dissenting).
97. Id
98. Id at 860-61 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
99. Id at 861 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
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cases stated that the Clearly Erroneous Rule applied to inferences from
undisputed or documentary evidence."°° A decision issued less than
one month earlier unequivocally stated that "[the Clearly Erroneous
Rule] applies both to evaluations of conflicting oral testimony and to
inferences drawn from documents and undisputed facts."'' 1 Similarly,
subsequent decisions stated that the Rule is applicable to these find-
ings. 102 The Gay Lib holding, however, has also been followed in a
subsequent case. 10
3
The Frito-Lay, Inc. v. So Good Potato Chip Co.'4 decision presented
a similar situation concerning the relationship between the applicabil-
ity of the Clearly Erroneous Rule and the ability of the trial court to
assess credibility.0 5 In Frito-Lay, the issue was whether the design of
two corn chip packages was similar."°6 The appellate court refused to
be bound by the trial court's finding of nonsimilarity in the absence of
a showing that it was clearly erroneous. "This Court must view the
same evidence and, in doing so, is free to reach a different conclusion
unrestricted by the limitation of the clearly erroneous standard of re-
view."10 7
100. School Dist. No. 54 v. Celotex Corp., 556 F.2d 883, 885 (8th Cir. 1977); Worthen Bank &
Trust Co. v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 370 F.2d 97, 100 (8th Cir. 1966); Lewis v. Super Valu Stores,
Inc., 364 F.2d 555, 556 (Sth.Cir. 1966); Baker v. United States, 343 F.2d 222, 224 (8th Cir. 1965);
Cole v. Neaf, 334 F.2d 326, 329 (8th Cir. 1964); Frank Adam Elec. Co. v. Colt's Patent Fire Arms
Mfg. Co., 148 F.2d 497, 499 (8th Cir. 1945).
101. Anderson v. Property Developers, Inc., 555 F.2d 648, 653 n.4 (8th Cir. 1977).
102. Clark Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 800 (8th Cir. 1978).
103. Stuppy v. United States, 560 F.2d 373, 376 n.6 (8th Cir. 1977).
104. 540 F.2d 927 (8th Cir. 1976).
105. Frito-Lay also presents an example of the appellate court, in addition to questioning the
applicability of the Rule because of its ability to assess the evidence, asserting that the question
was actually not one of fact, but rather a mixed question of law and fact. Id at 930 n.4. A similar
claim was made in Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 853-54 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977). This
is a claim oftentimes made when the appellate court seeks to avoid the constraints of the Clearly
Erroneous Rule; the appellate court is, of course, free to fully review issues of law.
The issue in Frito-Lay was whether design of two corn chip packages was similar. 540 F.2d at
928. In Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950), the Supreme Court
held that the issue of "equivalence"-whether two devices perform substantially the same func-
tion in substantially the same way to obtain the same result-was an issue of fact not to be dis-
turbed unless clearly erroneous. Id at 609-10. This writer would contend that the issue of
similarity is likewise an issue of fact. In the interest of candor, the writer notes that it was his
finding of nonsimilarity which was reversed by the appellate court in Frito-Lay.
106. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. So Good Potato Chip Co., 540 F.2d 927, 928 (8th Cir. 1977).
107. Id at 930.
Where, as here, there is no dispute as to the evidence upon which the District Court's
findings are based, where there are no credibility issues before this Court, and where
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss2/2
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This case, coupled with Gay Lib and its progeny, reflects the appel-
late courts' growing dissatisfaction with the constraints of the Clearly
Erroneous Rule. The decisions reflect movement toward the belief that
the Rule should only be applicable when the trial court's findings are
the result of weighing conflicting oral testimony. In effect, these deci-
sions use the second clause of the Rule to expand appellate authority to
overturn trial court findings of fact. The courts read the second clause
as a qualification on the application of the first rather than as an added
admonition to the appellate court. 1
8
This writer cannot so read the Rule. The second clause is an added
admonition to the appellate court, and a reminder that it should recog-
nize the superior position of the trial court in matters involving oral
testimony. The clause is not, and should not be, a limitation on the
applicability of the first. Even when findings are drawn from undis-
puted facts or documents, a trial judge who has participated in the case
from the beginning and has seen its entire mosaic unfold should be
better able to determine the facts than an appellate judge. Even in as-
sessing a witness' deposition a trial court will weigh the witness' testi-
mony in the context of the entire trial and, oftentimes, determine
credibility of a deposition witness based on veiled references made by
live witnesses. Certainly, a trial court's findings in these cases should
be subject to the Clearly Erroneous Rule.
To read the Rule otherwise is to contravene the drafters' clear intent,
as expressed in the comment accompanying the Rule'0 9 and relevant
Supreme Court holdings."i0 To read the Rule in this manner is also a
contravention of the words of the Rule itself. The two clauses are
joined by the conjunction "and," not by the hypothetical "if." The sig-
nificance of this "should [be] apparent to anyone who understands the
difference between a hypothetical and a conjunctive proposition."'1
both the contract and the physical evidence upon which the District Court based its
findings are a part of the record on appeal, we are not confined by the customary clearly
erroneous standard of review. First, no special deference is required in the review by this
Court of the interpretation given by the District Court to a nonambiguous agreement
.... Second, the same exhibits (the disputed packages) are before this Court as were
before the District Court. The trial judge reached his finding of nonsimilarity not on the
basis of expert testimony, but upon the basis of his personal observation of the appear-
ance of the packages of Frito-Lay and So Good arranged side-by-side.
Zd
108. See Doubtful Omniscience, supra note 1, at 769 (two clauses are separate restrictions).
109. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
110. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
I 11. Doubtful Omniscience, supra note 1 at 770.
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V. WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS EVER-BROADENING
SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW?
Perhaps the foregoing discussion of the current application of Rule
52(a) is what Chief Judge Lay had in mind when, in writing on the
same question, he said, "I dislike entering into a mired, well worn path
of semantic debate."' 12 The writer realizes that a reader, too, must
wonder if we are not making too much out of mere words or phrases.
Yet, it is submitted that more than superficial comparison of words or
phrases is involved. The words or phrases employed are but the out-
ward manifestation of an inner philosophy. The consequences of in-
creasing involvement of appellate courts in the fact finding process are
quite serious and should be addressed.
Charles Alan Wright expressed the concern of the writer, and of
many judges and lawyers, in discussing this question:
The principal consequences of broadening appellate review are two.
Such a course impairs the confidence of litigants and the public in the
decisions of the trial courts, and it multiplies the number of appeals ....
We may be sure that the broadened scope of appellate review we have
seen will mean an increase in the number of appeals .... It is literally
marvelous that, at a time when the entire profession is seeking ways to
minimize congestion and delay in the courts, we should get on a course
which inevitably must increase congestion and delay .... It is hard to
believe that there has been any great public dissatisfaction with the re-
stricted appellate review which was traditional in this country .... 113
Time has proven the correctness of Professor Wright's prophesies.
Many argue that public esteem of our trial courts is at its lowest point
in history. Admittedly, other factors contribute to the public's lack of
confidence in these courts, but the foremost reason is the increasingly
cavalier attitude of appellate courts in reversing trial court decisions.
Similarly, the proposition appears self-evident that litigants appeal
trial court decisions much more frequently in view of the broadened
range of appellate fact review. This writer is in daily contact with the
bench and bar of a metropolitan district court and will state categori-
cally that a noticeably greater percentage of trial court decisions is ap-
pealed today than was appealed twenty, fifteen, or even ten years ago.
And why should not a losing party appeal, especially in a judge-tried
112. Jackson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 522 F.2d 1272, 1275 (8th Cir.) (Lay, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 855 (1970).




case? Trial lawyers are close observers of the trends in court matters.
They sense that trial judges are becoming more and more like special
masters," 4 and that a trial de novo, by whatever name, is certainly a
possibility on appeal. Most lawyers will seek "two bites of the ap-
ple,"' 5 especially in a case in which the trial judge decided the facts.
Other undesirable consequences result from circumvention of Rule
52(a). A lowering in the morale of district court judges has clearly oc-
curred. Any attendant at judicial meetings will attest to this. The low-
ered morale goes well beyond the normal complaints about reversals.
It is reflected occasionally in a "what's the difference" attitude in opin-
ion writing and in a number of intangible ways. The morale factor not
only affects sitting judges, but it also makes the securing of top caliber
new judges more difficult.
The writer submits that another undesirable result is the decreasing
likelihood of settlements, at least at the trial level. Invariably, all par-
ties feel they will benefit from a second trial of the facts. In fact, uncer-
tainty about the scope of appellate fact review in some cases can cloud
the case from its very beginning.
The last significant consequence is that the widening of appellate fact
review is legally wrong. It is contrary to the history of our system of
jurisprudence. It exceeds the function of an appellate court, which is
"to discover and declare-or to make--the law."' 6 If our appellate
courts openly ignore the law, the respect for our legal system obviously
will decline.
Of course, appellate courts do not consciously seek to arrogate onto
themselves authority that more properly belongs in the trial courts.
Appellate judges are just as conscientious and dedicated as trial judges,
and it would be irresponsible to suggest otherwise. Instead, it is sub-
mitted that the expansion of appellate court power through circumven-
tion of Rule 52(a) is reflective of the sincere struggle transpiring in
almost every appellate judge's mind as he reviews a case. Shall he seek
to "do justice"1 7 as he sees it, or shall he limit his review of the cases to
the traditional scope of review called for by this writer? Because an
appellate judge may often disagree with the trial court as to what ' jus-
114. See Pendergrass v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 F. 2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1950).
115. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
116. Doubtful Omnrcience, supra note 1, at 779.
117. Id See also Miller v. United States, No. 79-1964, slip op. at 23 (8th Cir. Aug. 28, 1980)
(Arnold, J., dissenting).
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tice" dictates in a particular case, avoidance of the constraints of the
Clearly Erroneous Rule or subtle variations in the scope of review are
available techniques for the appellate judge who desires to "do justice."
Dean Leon Green recognized this tendency well before the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 52(a).1'B During
their work on the Rules, Judge Clark and others anticipated the same
problem and warned of the consequences of increased appellate fact
review."I9 Yet despite the good intentions of appellate judges and the
many warnings sounded by respected legal scholars, the appellate
courts today continue "to encroach upon the prerogatives of [the] fact
finder"''2 and to "derogate from the importance of [the trial judge's]
judicial function."' 2
VI. CONCLUSION
This writer's plea is that the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
consider the consequences of their increasing involvement in the fact
finding domain of the trial court. Solution of the problems addressed
in this Article remains with these courts; the Supreme Court is unlikely
to exercise its authority in the area.'
Solution of the problem does not call for a revision of the Rule or the
appointment of a committee to study the problem. Rather, appellate
judges must examine their own philosophies. They should ask them-
selves whether they are truly giving to a trial court's findings of fact the
deference envisioned by the Rule and called for by Supreme Court
precedents.
This writer believes great strides could be taken toward solving this
problem if the appellate courts would keep in mind two basic precepts:
1) The Clearly Erroneous Rule should be applied "in all classes
118. L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 380 (1930).
119. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
120. Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 612 F.2d 1353, 1364 (3rd Cir. 1980) (Al-
disert, J., dissenting).
121. Chesnut, supra note 32.
122. See Sumner v. Mata, 101 S. Ct. 764, 767 (1981):
If this were simply a run of the mine case in which an appellate court had reached an
opposite conclusion from a trial court in a unitary judicial system, there would be little
reason for invocation of this Court's discretionary jurisdiction to make a third set of
findings.




of findings in cases tried without a jury."" Even when a finding
is based on purely documentary evidence or stipulated facts, the
structure of the federal judicial system calls for the trial court's
findings to be sustained unless clearly erroneous.
2) In the words of the Honorable Learned Hand,
It is idle to try to define the meaning of the phrase "clearly errone-
ous"; all that can be profitably said is that an appellate court, though
it will hesitate less to reverse the finding of a judge than that of an
administrative tribunal or of a jury, will nevertheless reverse it most
reluctantly and only when well persuaded. 124
Conceding that appellate courts will continue to define the phrase,
however, the writer urges that, in so doing, they always keep in mind
the concept of reluctance and deference which is embodied within the
Rule.
If these two precepts are consistently kept in mind, the appellate
courts can redirect the bulk of their energies to their vital and tradi-
tional role of discovering, declaring, or, when appropriate, making the
law. If the courts' traditional role is attained, litigants, the bench, and
the bar will benefit. The general administration of justice will be vastly
improved by a return to the traditional balance between trial and ap-
pellate courts.
123. Doubtful Omniscience, supra note 1, at 765 (citing 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
152.01141 (2d ed. 1951)).
124. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945).
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